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Dean's opinion is bereft of references to basic American
Indian law doctrine, including the so-called "canons of
construction" that often play a controlling role in this
area. 7
If Warbus were a throwaway case, it would deserve
little notice. But it isn't. Warbus is a published opinion
of the Tax Court, and it's intended to have precedential
effect. 8 Since section 7873 hasn't been the subject of
prior judicial decisions, Warbus could have enormous
effect in developing the understanding of that section. 9
Even more important, Warbus could come to stand for
the proposition that the Tax Court can ignore American
Indian law principles in tax disputes that involve Indian tribes or Indian tribal members.
I'll show why none of that should happen. Warbus
deserves to be discarded as precedent for at least two
reasons. First, as I've noted, the opinion shows no
awareness of fundamental American Indian law principles. Second, the decision is flawed even in its narrow, more technical aspects. The court did an inadequate job on the issues that should have been evident
to any tax lawyer reading section 7873. In fact, the
judge misread the statute.

I

Warbus deserves to be discarded as
precedent for at least two reasons.

I emphasize that my criticisms of Warbus are based
on professional concerns about the opinion and what
it could mean for the development of the law. I'm afraid
that at times I may seem unfair to Judge Dean. Many
of the problems in the opinion weren't his fault. Judge
Dean received little or no guidance from the litig~nts
on some critical points, especially the basics of
American Indian law. But regardless of where the fault
lies, strong criticism is necessary to demonstrate why

Warbus should be disregarded in later disputes arising
from the intersection of American Indian law and
federal tax law.
I. Warbus v. Commissioner: The Facts and the Code
Around 1984, Warbus, a member of the Lummi Nation, bought a fishing boat, the Denis.e W, a purchase
financed partly through borrowing from a commercial
lender and partly by Warbus's note issued to the boat's
former owner. In 1984, Warbus borrowed another
$50,000 from the commercial lender, a loan secured by
the Denise W. 10 The proceeds were used, among other
things, to acquire a salmon net, to make a payment on
the earlier loan, and to make insurance and mortgage
payments. 11 The Bureau of Indian Affairs guaranteed
the $50,000 loan.12
From 1986 until1991, Warbus was engaged in tribal
fishing activity protected by the Treaty of Point Elliott, 13 and Warbus used the Denise W in that activity.
However, around 1993, Warbus defaulted on the
$50,000 loan. The boat was repossessed, and in 1993
BIA had to fulfill its obligation as guarantor, paying
over $13,506, partly principal and partly interest, to the
lender. The BIA sent Warbus the appropriate form (a
"1099") to indicate that he had $13,506 in DOI income. 14
Warbus didn't report the DOI income. In fact, he
didn't file a tax return or pay estimated taxes for 1993.1 5
Since Warbus conceded that he had had rental income
of $6,000 and self-employment income of $3,700 in that
year, and he therefore unquestionably owed some tax,
Warbus wasn't the most sympathetic litigant.l 6 Nevertheless, although the fisherman's hands weren't very
clean, the proper tax treatment of the DOl income was
a legitimate issue on its own.
Under traditional tax analysis, Warbus had taxable
income from the discharge of indebtedness. He had
borrowed money tax-free, and later he was relieved of
the obligation to repay some of the borrowed dollars.

7

See infra Part II A.
There's a never-ending dispute within the Tax Court
about the precedential effect of the court's not-officially-published "memorandum opinions," which "are supposed to be
limited to those having no value as precedent [(i.e.,] any case
decided solely upon the authority of another, cases involving
subjects already well covered by opinions appearing in the
bound volumes of the reports, failure of proof cases and some
others." J. Edgar Murdock, "What Has the Tax Court of the
United States Been Doing?," 31 A.B.A. J. 297, 299 (1945); see
Mark F. Sommer & Anne D. Waters, "Tax Court Memorandum Opinions
What Are They Worth?" Tax Notes, July 20,
1998, p. 384; see also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts:
Challenges and Reform 163 n.9 (1996) (collecting commentary).
Whatever the value of memorandum opinions, however, a
published opinion like Warbus is unquestionably precedent.
9
The only published authority on section 7873 before War bus
was Notice 89-34, 1989-1 C.B. 674, which set out the government's position on some matters that aren't directly relevant
to this article. In Kieffer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-202,
Doc 98-17481 (9 pages), 98 TNT 106-14, decided shortly after
Warbus, Judge Dean had occasion to cite section 7873 once
again, concluding inter alia- in what must be the least controversial ruling of the year- that income from timber sales
is not income from a "fishing rights-related activity."
8

106

10

Warbus, 110 T.C. at 280.
Id. at 280-81.
12
Id. at 281.
13
The treaty was signed in 1855 by the United States and
a number of tribes, including the Lummi Nation, in the
Washington Territory, and was ratified by the Senate in 1859.
Treaty Between the United States and the Dwamish, Suquamish, and Other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians
in Washington Territory, 12 Stat. 927 (1859). Article V provides:
The right of taking fish at usual and accustomed
grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians
in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of
erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing,
together with the privilege of hunting and gathering
roots and berries on open and unclaimed lands. Provided, however, that they shall not take shell-fish from
any beds staked or cultivated by citizens.
Id. at 928.
14
Warbus, 110 T.C. at 281.
11

15Jd.
16

Trial Memorandum for Respondent, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (No. 2194-96).
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That's the classic scenario for DOI income: you don't
have to report the dollars when received because
you're obligated to pay them back. However, if you're
later released from the payback obligation, you then
have income. In effect, DOI income represents a
deferred inclusion of previously untaxed loan
proceeds.
There may have been a discharge of indebtedness,
or something substantively similar, 17 but Warbus could
point to a special Internal Revenue Code section that
arguably applied to his situation. Section 7873, added
to the code in 1988, provides in pertinent part that "no
tax shall be imposed ... on income derived ... by a
member of an Indian tribe directly or through a qualified Indian entity ... from a fishing rights-related
activity of such tribe." 18
That's my case, argued Warbus. And the government conceded that, between 1986 and 1991, Warbus
was engaged in a "fishing rights-related activity": "any
activity directly related to harvesting, processing, or
transporting fish harvested in the exercise of a recognized fishing right of [an Indian] tribe or to selling such
fish but only if substantially all of such harvesting was
performed by members of such tribe. " 19 In general,
"recognized fishing rights" means "fishing rights
secured ... by a treaty between [the] tribe and the
United States or by an Executive order or an Act of
Congress" 20 - exactly the sort of rights reserved to the
Lummi Nation by the Treaty of Point Elliott. 21
For section 7873 to exempt income from taxation,
therefore, (1) a fishing rights-related activity must be
in operation, and (2) the income at issue must be
"derived directly from" that activity. 22 The protected
activity was conceded to exist in Warbus. If the DOI
income was sufficiently connected to the treatyprotected fishing activity, Warbus should have
prevailed.
17
Not everyone would characterize what happened in Warbus as generating DOl income. The lender was paid by BIA;
the lender didn't forgive Warbus's obligation. Nevertheless,
I'll use the term "DOl" in this article for two reasons. First,
the parties and the court used the term. Second, the transaction can be reconceptualized as DOl because BIA stepped into
the lender's shoes. Warbus effectively came to owe BIA the
$13,506, an obligation that was then forgiven. In any event,
however one labels the theory for inclusion, there was unquestionably income to Warbus under traditional notions when
BIA satisfied Warbus's obligation.
18
Section 7873( a)(1 ).
19
Section 7873(b )(1 ).
20
Section 7873(b )(2).
21
See supra note 13.
22
The full text of section 7873(a)(1) refers to "income
derived directly or through a qualified Indian entity." A "qualified Indian entity" is generally an entity that is formed by a
tribe to engage in a qualified fishing activity and that meets
certain specific, technical requirements- e.g., that "all of the
equity interests in the entity are owned by qualified Indian
tribes, members of such tribes, or their spouses." Section
7873(b)(3)(A)(ii). Judge Dean concluded that the Bureau of
Indian Affairs is not such a qualified entity and that this
alternative route to exemption was therefore unavailable to
Warbus. I don't dispute that part of the opinion.
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II. How the Warbus Court Erred
The issue in Warbus, simply stated, was this: Was
the DOI income of Warbus "income derived ... directly
... from" an activity that was conceded to be "a fishing
rights-related activity" of the Lummi Nation?
When I first saw squibs describing Warbus, my
response to this question was "Why not?" Warbus used
the Denise W in a tribal activity that the government
agreed was a fishing rights-related activity, and the
DOI arose from the foreclosure of that boat. After
studying the issue, my response- now, I hope, a bit
more thoughtful - is still "Why not?"

If the DOl income was sufficiently
connected to the treaty-protected
fishing activity, Warbus should have
prevailed.

I

As I understand Judge Dean's opinion, he had two
basic problems with Warbus's arguments: First, there
was no express exemption of the DOI income from
taxation and, second, the income was not closely
enough connected with the treaty-protected activity.
In a moment I'll show why each of these is a nonproblem. But first, to set the stage, I'll briefly describe
the so-called "canons of construction" in American Indian law, canons that should have informed Judge
Dean's opinion. IfWarbus's arguments had any merit
at all, the canons should have made his position a sure
winner.

A. Canons of Construction
American Indian law is full of ambiguity: ancient
treaties and statutes don't speak in modern terms. This
problem isn't a new one- the relationship of treaty
and statutory language to everyday usage has always
been tenuous at best23 - and long ago judges
developed a set of principles, the so-ca,lled "canons of
construction," to deal with the inherent ambiguity in
this field.
The canons originated in treaty interpretation.
Treaties with the Indian tribes have often been likened
to contracts of adhesion, the powerful United States
imposing its will on the relatively weak and powerless
tribes. Everything, including the language used in the
"negotiations" and final document, favored the United
States at the expense of the tribes. To implement those
treaties in a fair and reasonable way, judges must try
to understand what the affected tribal officials thought
they were agreeing to, or would have thought if they
had been able to imagine the nature of twentieth century controversies, regardless of the actual treaty language used. As Chief Justice John Marshall made the
point in Worcester v. Georgia/4

23
See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman,
"Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: 'As Long as
Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth' - How Long a
Time is That?" 63 Cal. L. Rev. 601 (1975).
24
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)..
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The language used in treaties with the Indians
should never be construed to their prejudice. If
words be made use of, which are susceptible of a
more extended meaning than their plain import, as
connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should
be considered as used only in the latter sense. 25
More recently, the Court has concluded that "[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak
and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith." 26

If there is a question about whether
ambiguity exists, the canons point
toward finding an ambiguity, one that
must then be resolved favorably to
Indian interests.
That principle has remained the law. The canons are
phrased in different ways in different cases, but the
basic tenets remain: Try to understand provisions as
the unlettered Indians would have understood them;
if there is doubt, resolve the doubt in favor of the tribes;
and so on. In general, whatever the language used, the
canons encompass the following points: "1) very liberal
construction to determine whether Indian rights exist;
and 2) very strict construction to determine whether
Indian rights are to be abridged or abrogated." 27
Chief Justice Marshall was writing about interpreting treaties in Worcester, but the canons have been extended since his day to apply to the interpretation of
statutes, executive orders, and regulations as well. This
isn't a matter of choice: judges are obligated to follow
the canons. Accordingly, if there is doubt about the
language in legal authority affecting Indian rights, that
doubt must be resolved in a way favorable to the affected tribe or the affected tribal member. It wouldn't
be overstating matters much to say that, in disputes
arising from the interpretation of treaties, statutes, and
other documents, if a court sees ambiguity in the
relevant language, the position of the tribe or the tribal
member will prevail. 28
In fact, the cap.ons ought to apply in determining
whether there is an ambiguity needing resolution.2 9 It's
entirely consistent with the canons as they have
25

Id. at 582.
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
27
David H. Getches, et al., Federal Indian Law: Cases and
Materials 348 (3d ed. 1993).
28
Tribal interests and the interests of individual tribal
members may not coincide in particular cases. For present
purposes, I put that real problem to the side; no such conflict
existed in Warbus.
29
Similar debates occur in connection with "plain meaning" theories of statutory interpretation. How much ambiguity is necessary before a court may look at something
other than the statutory language? How plain must a "plain
meaning" be? Of course, critics of plain-meaning doctrines
suggest that judicial adherents of the doctrine see plain
meaning only when doing so leads to the desired interpretation. See William D. Popkin, "Law-Making Responsibility
and Statutory Interpretation," 68 Ind. L.J. 865, 875-80 (1993).
26
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developed to require courts to look for ways to interpret controlling language in favor of the affected tribe
or tribal member. Put another way: If there is a question
about whether ambiguity exists, the canons point
toward finding an ambiguity, one that must then be
resolved favorably to Indian interests.
The application of the canons may not always be
clear, and judges have circumvented the canons by
purporting to find no ambiguity in inherently ambiguous documents. However, even when that happens, judges typically acknowledge the existence of the
canons and explain why the canons don't affect the
result. 30 The canons, after all, are part of the law. To
altogether ignore the canons, and to make no attempt
to honor their commands, is unacceptable in a late
twentieth century American Indian law case.
But that's what happened in Warbus.
There's no particular reason to expect a Tax Court
judge to be aware of the canons. Judges need help in
understanding areas of the law with which they are
unfamiliar, but Judge Dean was left to his own devices.
Other than citing cases in which the canons had been
discussed, 31 the parties gave Judge Dean no hint of the
canons' existence. 32 The fault was not the judge's, but
his innocence does not make Warbus any more
palatable as authority.

B. Taxability Presumption; Its Relationship to Indians
With the American Indian law canons of construction as a backdrop, I now examine Judge Dean's
problems with War bus's argument.
It's not the case, noted Judge Dean, that a Native
American's income is presumed to be exempt from
federal taxation. Quite the contrary. The judge wrote,
"Tax exemptions, including those affecting native
peoples, are not granted by implication. If Congress
intends to exempt certain income, it must do so expressly."33
That tax exemptions cannot be granted by implication is a generally unobjectionable proposition, and
American Indians are federal taxpayers, except in special situations. 34 But it's not clear what that proposition

30
See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 263 (1992) (applying
canons generously to forbid ~xcise tax on sale of fee land
within reservation boundaries while generally downplaying
effect of canons in concluding that ad valorem tax on such
lands was permissible).
31
E.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); see infra notes
36-48 and accompanying text.
32
Indeed, Warbus's Reply Brief credited the commissioner
with having "recite[d] an unexceptional history of the intersection of Indian Law with Tax Law," even though there had
been no mention of the canons in the government's brief.
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110
T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96). There was no recitation of the
canons, even in boilerplate form, in any brief.
33
Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282-83.
34
For example, a treaty might protect members of a particular tribe from having to pay otherwise applicable federal
taxes, or a statute like section 7873 could exempt all of a tribal
member's income.
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has to do with the Warbus facts. The claim wasn't that
Warbus's income was automatically outside the reach
of the code; such a claim would have been a sure loser. 35
The claim was that section 7873 is the express exemption that Congress has the power to grant. Facing a
plausible argument that a specific, express exemption
existed, Judge Dean should have parsed the statutory
language carefully to see whether section 7873 applied
to Warbus. Had he also been better advised about his
obligations in an American Indian law case, he should
have examined the statutory language with the canons
of construction in mind.

I

Squire v. Capoeman was no ordinary
tax case.

That's what the Supreme Court did in the 1956 case
Squire v. Capoeman, 36 which dealt with the tax liability
of an Indian couple. The Capoemans claimed exemption from federal income taxation on the proceeds of
timber sold from their allotted lands - lands for which
they hadn't yet been issued a patent in fee simple. 37
Simply put, the government's primary position in
Squire was that, as American citizens, the Capoemans

35
Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282-83. In fact, in three cases decided
before the enactment of section 7873, the Tax Court had held
that income from treaty-protected fishing activities was taxable. See Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 249, 252, 88
TNT 33-17 (1988); Earl v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1014, 1020
(1982); Strom v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 621, 628 (1946), aff'd per
curiam, 158 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1947). Congress sidestepped the
status of pre-section 7873 fishing income: "Nothing in the
amendments [establishing section 7873] shall create any inference as to the existence or non-existence or scope of any
exemption from tax for income derived from fishing rights
secured as of March 17, 1988 . . . . " Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, section
3044(b), 102 Stat. 3342, 3642. I'm not sure those cases were
correctly decided, but that doesn't matter for this analysis. To
say that Warbus' s income might have been taxable had there
been no 1988 tax legislation is not to say it should have been
taxable with section 7873 on the books.
36
351 u.s. 1 (1956).
37
Id. at 3. This isn't the place for an extended discussion
of allotment. It's enough for present purposes to understand
the following: Congress in the late nineteenth century
enacted a number of allotment laws, which were intended to
break up the Indian land mass and convert the American
Indians into yeoman farmers. When applicable, the acts "allotted" 80 or 160 acre parcels to individual Indians. The parcels were to stay in trust until the passage of a certain period
of time or until the Indian became "competent," i.e., was
deemed fit to become a citizen, at which time the individual
was to be issued a patent for the land by the federal government. In most cases, the land passed out of Indian hands
altogether; the allotment acts were disastrous for American
Indians as a whole. But in many particular cases the trust
period was extended. Since 1934 no patents have been issued
for allotted lands; lands held in trust at that time have continued to be held in trust. The Capoemans held land that had
been allotted to Mr. Capoeman, and they therefore had a
special tie to that land. But they didn't have, and would never
have, fee simple title. Id. at 4.
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were subject to federal income taxation. As the Court
explained, "The government urges us to view this case
as an ordinary tax case without regard to the treaty,
relevant statutes, congressional policy concerning Indians, or the guardian-ward relationship between the
United States and these particular Indians." 38 While it's
true, wrote Chief Justice Warren, that "in ordinary affairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial legislation, [Indians] are subject to the payment of income
taxes as are other citizens," 39 Squire v. Capoeman was
no ordinary tax case.
The Capoemans' situation wasn't ordinary because
there were statutory provisions, relating to allotted
lands, that arguably exempted their timber income.
Therefore, the Court examined provisions of the General Allotment Act of 188740 and a 1906 amendment to
that act41 - enactments that defined the nature of the
Capoemans' interest in the lands from which the timber had been taken. The General Allotment Act could
be interpreted as precluding all taxation of allotted
land until a patent had been issued. It was only after
the issuance of a patent that" all restrictions as to sale,
incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be
removed. " 42 This language suggested to the Court "a
congressional intent to subject an Indian allottee to all
taxes only after a patent in fee is issued to the allottee."43
Indeed, said the Court, if there was any doubt about
how the General Allotment Act should be read in these
circumstances, the canons of construction removed
that doubt. With the "doubtful expressions" of the Act
read favorably to the Capoemans, 44 no federal tax could
be imposed on income from the allotted land. Moreover, relying on writings of Indian law scholar Felix
Cohen, the Court interpreted the exemption to apply
to "income derived directly" from the land, 45 a category
that included the net proceeds from the timber sales.
Like Judge Dean in Warbus, the Squire Court accepted the general proposition that "exemptions to tax
laws should be clearly expressed." 46 .But that proposi-

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
4
°Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.).
41
Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25
U.S.C. section 349).
42
25 U.S.C. section 349 (emphasis added). In its nearly full
form, the proviso to Section 6 of the General Allotment Act,
as amended, reads as follows:
That. .~he Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable
of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to
be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and
thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or
taxation of said land shall be removed ....
43
Squire, 351 U.S. at 7.
44
See Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
45 Squire, 351 U.S. at 9 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 265 (1942)).
46
Id. at 6.
38
39
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tion merely begins the analysis. In an Indian law context, individuals searching for 11 express" exemptions
must do their research mindful of the canons of construction.47 The Supreme Court in Squire analyzed the
controlling statutes in a way favorable to the Indian
taxpayers to see whether an 11 express" exemption existed; that's what Warbus should have asked the Tax
Court to do in his case. 48 Instead, he punted. 49

I

Section 7873 lends itself to good
old-fashioned statutory analysis of a
sort that tax lawyers do every day.

All of which brings us to the interpretation of section
7873, the claimed express exemption in Warbus. I'll
argue that the canons of construction weren't necessary
to find an "express" exemption for Warbus's DOl income, since section 7873 is clear enough on its own
terms. But whether that argument is right or not, the
canons should have made this an easy case for the
taxpayer.
C. Section 7873: Income and 'Activity'
Section 7873 lends itself to good old-fashioned
statutory analysis of a sort that tax lawyers do every
day.
1. The structure of section 7873. Warbus, Judge Dean
wrote, "argue[ d) that the purchase of the Denise Wand
expenditures for associated equipment and operating
expenses are fishing-rights related and that therefore
the income from discharge of indebtedness incurred to
meet these expenses is fishing-rights related." 50
What precisely is the problem with that argument?
Since the government had conceded that a "fishing
rights-related activity" existed, the problem had to be
that Warbus's DOl income was insufficiently connected with that activity. In Judge Dean's words, the
DOl income was the
result of the freeing of [Warbus's] assets from
obligations by the BIA in 1993, not from any activity by him 'directly related' to harvesting,

processing, transporting, or selling fish in the exercise of recognized fishing rights of an Indian tribe. 51
This is the passage that I would like to focus on in the
Warbus opinion.
To begin with, Judge Dean garbled the statutory
language. Compare the Warbus quotation, with its reference to "activity by him" and the quotation marks around
directly related," with the actual language of section
7873. 52 The statute doesn't include the words "by him."53
As I discuss below, Judge Dean improperly personalized
the activity" requirement. Moreover, the "directly related" phrase that Judge Dean highlighted is merely part
of the definition of "fishing rights-related activity," and
that definition wasn't at issue in Warbus. Because the
government had conceded that a qualifying activity existed, the only question should have been whether the
income at issue was "derived ... directly ... from" the
qualifying activity. None of the language in the quoted
passage addresses that portion of section 7873.
Suppose Warbus had been able to show that he purchased the boat, paid expenses, and therefore incurred
the associated debt only for the purpose of engaging in
the Lummi Nation's treaty-protected activity. If he could
have shown that- a position that the government largely conceded54 - surely that would have been enough
of a connection to make the DOl income tax-exempt.
Or would it? If I'm reading the passage from Judge
Dean's opinion correctly, one of his concerns was the
relative passivity of the DOl income; for all we know,
Warbus may have been asleep at the precise moment
the DOl income was realized. I interpret Judge Dean's
phrase "from any activity by him" as drawing this activity versus passivity distinction. It doesn't matter,
that is, why the Denise W was acquired and how it was
used; it doesn't matter why the borrowing occurred. If
so, Warbus would mean that DOl income can never be
section 7873 income.
If that's what he meant, Judge Dean misunderstood
the word "activity" in section 7873. Return to the
statutory language: "income derived ... directly ...
from a fishing rights-related activity." 55 The "activity"
11

II

51

47

The effects of the canons can be tempered in some special
situations. For example, once Congress acts to clearly make
land subject to state taxation, reacquisition of the land by a
tribe will not exempt the land from taxation. Congress must
make any new exemption "unmistakably clear." Cass County
v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 118 S. Ct. 1904, 1910, 98
TNT 110-8 (1998).
48
Squire, 351 U.S. at 6-8. Particularly when the canons of
construction are applied, the usual requirement that an exemption from taxation be "express" should not be interpreted to mean "beyond any doubt." That someone can come
up with a different spin on statutory language should not
mean, by itself, that a provision is not "express."
49
See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96) ("Petitioner Warbus
agrees that, absent some expressed exemption found in
statute or treaty, Indians are subject to the federal income tax
laws the same as any other citizens.").
50
Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282.
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Id. at 283 (note omitted).
See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
53
ln another part of the opinion, Judge Dean used language almost identical to the language quoted above, but
without the nonstatutory phrase "by him." See Warbus, 110
T.C. at 283.
54
See Respondent's Brief in Answer at 12-13, Warbus v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96) (citations
omitted):
It is not disputed in this case that Petitioner obtained the $50,000 loan, which the BIA satisfied in 1993,
primarily to obtain funds for use in Petitioner's treaty
fishing rights-related activity. It is not disputed that
the Denise W, the asset which secured this $50,000 loan,
was utilized in Petitioner's treaty fishing rights-related
activity. Further, it is not disputed that Petitioner was
engaged in a treaty fishing rights-related activity from
1986 to 1991, the time during which the Denise W was
operated by petitioner.
55
Section 7873(a)(1).
52
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IIIII
'

I!

required by the statute is the "fishing rights-related
activity," which includes "harvesting, processing, or
transporting fish harvested in the exercise of a recognized fishing right." 56 The statutory language is as
clear as it can be that the required "activity" is the
overall structure of treaty-protected behavior that a
tribe engages in and from which tribal members derive
income: "from a fishing rights-related activity of such
tribe." 57 The requirement that there be such an activity
was satisfied in Warbus; the government had conceded
the point for the Lummi Nation.
In the passage quoted above, Judge Dean would
instead have us ask whether the income was "from any
activity by [Warbus] ... 'directly related' to a [treatyprotected activity]." That's too much activity for me, 58
and it's more activity than section 7873 requires. By
mixing up the "activity" requirement and the "income
derived directly" requirement of section 7873, Judge
Dean effectively rewrote the statutory provision. Section 7873 focuses on the connection of the income with
the protected activity, not on whether the particular
taxpayer is doing physical activity at the time an item
of income is earned or an expenditure is made.

By mixing up the 'activity' requirement
and the 'income derived directly'
requirement of section 7873, Judge
Dean effectively rewrote the statutory
provision.
2. The meaning of 'activity' in other code sections.
Judge Dean's conception of the term "activity" doesn't
fit section 7873, and it's not supported by the way the
term is used elsewhere in the code. 59 To make that
point, I'll discuss the oxymoronic passive activity loss
(PAL) rules of section 469, enacted in 1986, only two
years before the passage of section 7873, and the at-risk
rules of section 465, enacted in 1976 but significantly
extended in 1986. 60 These two sections were the
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Section 7873(b )(1).
Section 7873( a)(1 ).
58
I agree with the statement usually attributed, probably
erroneously, to Robert Maynard Hutchins: "Every time I
think about exercise, I lie down until the thought passes."
59
Judge Dean made no reference to the term's use elsewhere. This failure (and it is a failure) wasn't entirely his
fault. As with the canons of construction, he received no help
from the parties. On the other ·hand, interpreting code language is part of his job.
60
Whatever the empirical validity of the assumption that
members of Congress have any know ledge of the language
used in other code provisions, that assumption is made all
the time by courts. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) ("We generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the
legislation it enacts."). This is an assumption that seems particularly appropriate when a term, like "activity," was used
in 1988 legislation, only two years after it was a centerpiece
of the widely noted PAL rules.
57
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primary, and largely successful, weapons used against
abusive tax shelters.
I'm going to try, as simply as possible, to show that
use of the term "activity" in an Internal Revenue Code
provision doesn't necessarily mean that a taxpayer
must be engaged in vigorous exercise to be subject to
the statute. Indeed, the PAL rules would make no sense
with such a requirement. To have an interest in a passive activity, and therefore to be subject to section 469,
requires that a taxpayer not be personally active. 61 The
at-risk rules also were intended to attack certain lossgenerating investments, denominated "activities," in
which investors were likely to be personally inactive.
a. Passive activity loss (PAL) rules. Suppose a taxpayer-doctor has a loss attributable to his interest as
limited partner in a limited partnership that engages
in a trade or business. There is, by definition, activity
going on, but the taxpayer doesn't participate very
much, if at all, in the activity. That's the quintessential
interest in a passive activity, a trade or business in
which the taxpayer doesn't materially participate, 62
and that's the sort of loss-generating investment section 469 addresses.
Section 469 made losses from passive "activities"
much less valuable than they had been under pre-Tax
Reform Act of 1986law, in that such losses can be used
only to offset income from passive activities. 63 The doctor can't use his PALs to currently offset his active
income from medical practice, nor can he use the passive losses to offset his portfolio income - the dividends, in~erest, and so on he earns from his investments.64 He can carry the currently unusable losses
forward to use when he has generated additional passive activity income 65 but, all other things being equal,
deferred losses aren't as valuable as currently usable
ones. By limiting the utility of PALs, section 469 made
investments in loss-generating passive activities much
less attractive than had been the case before 1986. 66
61
0f course, taxpayers generally don't want to be subject
to section 469: those with losses don't want the losses limited
by the PAL rules. But a taxpayer with PALs that would otherwise not be currently deductible wants income to be characterized as coming from a passive activity.
62
Section 469(c)(1). Material participation is defined in section 469(h)(1). Interests in limited partnerships are presumptively interests in passive activities. Section 469(h)(2).
63
Section 469(a)(1) disallows the deduction of a "passive activity loss," which is defined as the excess of losses from passive
activities over income from passive activities. Section 469(d)(1).
The effect is that losses from passive activities may be deducted
currently to offset any income from passive activities.
64
Section 469(e)(1) defines such income as not being from
a passive activity.
65
Section 469(b ). When a taxpayer disposes of substantially his entire interest in a passive activity in a fully taxable
transaction, (e.g., by selling the limited partnership interest),
he can then deduct the previously suspended losses. Section
469(g)(1) (defining such losses as not from a passive activity).
66
As a result, doctors won't passively invest in such activities to generate losses to offset their medical income. Section 469 has been so effective because it has largely
eliminated the objectionable behavior to which the provision
would otherwise apply.
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Now suppose our hypothetical limited partnership
recognizes some DOl income associated with the trade
or business it conducts. The doctor's limited partnership interest remains an interest in a passive activity.
Can DOl income attributable to such a passive activity be income from a passive activity to our
hypothetical limited partner? Absolutely, if the connection with the passive activity is shown. 67 That is, the
income can be associated with an activity even though
the taxpayer is completely inactive; that's the nature of
income from a passive activity. 68 And that's one of the
lessons to transfer to the analysis of section 7873.

I

In Judge Dean's defense, there are
facts in Warbus that could reasonably
have given the court pause on the
statutory interpretation issue.

DOl income is neither inherently active nor inherently passive; its character under section 469
depends on the nature of the activity to which it's
allocated. That characterization has almost nothing to
do with the extent of the actual efforts involved in
generating the DOl income. Under the PAL rules, the
extent of a taxpayer's participation is significant in
determining whether his interest is a passive activity
- does he materially participate? - but the characterization of a particular item of income or loss isn't
determined by looking at the taxpayer's level of effort
with respect to that item. It's simply, or sometimes not
so simply, a matter of determining whether the income
is attributable to the passive, or non-passive, activity.
b. At-risk rules. Another example of the use of," activity" can be found in the at-risk rules of section 465,
Congress's first attack on tax shelters. In general, section 465 limits a taxpayer's ability to take deductions
relating to an" activity" to the amount that the taxpayer
has "at risk" in the activity. 69 As is true with the PAL
rules, the at-risk rules make certain sorts of deductions

67
See Rev. Rul. 92-92, 1992-2 C.B. 103 (discussing allocation
of DOl income between passive activity expenditures and
other expenditures); cf LTR 9522008, 95 TNT 108-24 (holding
DOl income to be investment income on the facts). The focus
is allocation "at the time indebtedness is discharged." Characterization of income as passive would generally be a good
thing for taxpayers who have otherwise nondeductible PALs.
See supra note 61.
68
Would DOl income attributable to an activity not be
income from a passive activity if the taxpayer materially
participates in the activity? Again the answer is yes. DOl
income can clearly be treated as income from a "trade or
business," a term that presupposes the existence of activity.
Section 108, which provides for special deferral rules for DOl
income in special circumstances, assumes that DOI income
can be associated with a trade or business.
69
Section 465(a)(1). Taxpayers are generally at risk for the
amount of cash and the adjusted basis of property contributed to the activity, and for the amount of borrowing for
which they are personally liable. Taxpayers generally aren't
at risk for amounts borrowed on a nonrecourse basis. See
section 465(b), (c).

much less valuable than used to be the case (in general,
deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt and other
risk-limiting arrangements used in almost all abusive tax
shelters). 70 One doesn't avoid being subject to section
465's limitations by arguing th~t one is inactive. In addition, income, including DOl income, can be attributable
to an "activity" even though a particular taxpayer's efforts in the activity are minimal or nonexistent.
The relevant determination under the PAL and at-risk
rules is whether the DOl income relates to an "activity."
The question isn't whether the particular taxpayer
engaged in a certain level of activity wjth respect to that
one income item. There's no apparent reason why the
same analysis shouldn't apply under section 7873.
3. Connection of DOl income with the Lummi Nation
'activity.' We know that there was a "fishing rightsrelated activity" in Warbus, since the government conceded that point. The appropriate question, the only
question, should have been whether the DOl income
was "derived ... directly ... from" that activity, not
whether Warbus was "active" in generating the DOl
income.
It wouldn't strain the statutory language at all to see
DOl income attributable to the foreclosure of a fishing
boat acquired for use in a "fishing rights-related activity" as being "derived directly from" that activity,
just as DOl income can be income from a passive activity. If that was Warbus's situation, and it is consistent with what we know of the facts/ 1 he should have
won. Such an interpretation of section 7873 wouldn't
create serious opportunities for manipulation by members of treaty-protected tribes; the connection between
the DOl income in Warbus and the protected activity
was hardly imaginary. 72 And it wouldn't create tax
shelter opportunities that Wall Street could take advantage o£. 73
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This isn't to say that nonrecourse debt is necessarily
abusive. It is to say that abusive shelters routinely used nonrecourse debt, or what purported to be nonrecourse debt.
71
See supra note 54.
72
The government emphasized that section 7873 should
not be used to confer "tax-free status on other income derived
by Indians from other sources." Respondent's Brief in
Answer at 12, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No.
2194-96) (quoting Hearings on S. 1239 Before the Subcomm.
on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. of
Finance, 100th Cong. 13 (1988) (statement of Dennis E. Ross,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy)).
That principle is unobjectionable as a general matter, but it's
hard to see how holding this DOl income exempt - income
from foreclosure of a fishing boat - would create opportunities to exempt income from other sources.
73
At least I don't think it would, but one should never
underestimate the creativity of tax planners: "The tax bar is
the repository of the greatest ingenuity in America, and given
the chance, those people will do you in." Legislation Relating
to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982)
(testimony of Martin D. Ginsburg) (quoted in Jonathan L.
Entin, "Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel
Law Reform," 38 Mercer L. Rev. 835, 835 (1987)).
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One shouldn't interpret the "derived directly from"
language in section 7873, particularly when read with
the canons of construction, as requiring an impossibly
difficult showing of a connection between the income
at issue and the protected activity. That wasn't the
purpose behind the language. It was intended to require allocation between exempt income and non-exempt income - not all fishing income is necessarily
exempt to a tribal member- not to impose insuperable
burdens of proof.
The Senate Report on the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,74 which included the new
section 7873, notes that the act "exempts only that income 'derived' from fishing rights-related activities.
Thus, ... individual tribal members ... are required
under the bill to allocate income and expenses among
fishing rights-related activities and all other activities."75 Fair enough: the "directly derived" rule is
an allocation rule, not a burden of proof provision. Life
is made up of activities, and it's necessary to allocate
income items, like DOI income, among those activities.76
The report then contains an example of when allocation is required:
If ... an individual tribal member derives 60
percent of his or her gross income in a taxable
year from fishing in protected waters and the
remaining 40 percent from fishing outside
protected waters, then 60 percent of the member's
income would be exempt from tax ... , and any
expenses ... attributable to such exempt income
could not be used to offset gross income derived
from fishing outside prohibited waters or any
other income. 77
If Warbus had used the Denise W in part for treatyprotected fishing, and in part for other purposes, then
some of the. DOI income should not have been exempt.
But except for one obscure footnote 78 in a Senate
Finance Committee report, a footnote that is hardly
controlling, nothing in the statutory language or the
legislative history suggests that all $13,506 of DOI income should have been automatically taxable. 79

74

Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (codified at scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
75
S. Rep. No. 100-445, at 475 (1988).
76
Which is to say that DOl income is attributable to some
activity.
77
S. Rep. No. 100-445, supra note 75, at 475.
78
To fans of footnotes, "obscure footnote" isn't redundant.
79
The footnote stated that an entity should not fail the 90
percent test to be a "qualified Indian entity" in a particular
year "solely by reason of extraordinary and nonrecurring
events, such as the sale of a boat or other property." S. Rep.
No. 100-445, supra note 75, at 474 n.141. The 90 percent test
provides, in general, that a qualified Indian entity must
derive 90 percent or more of its annual gross receipts "from
fishing rights-related activities of one or more qualified Indian tribes." Section 7873(b )(3)(A)(iii); see also supra note 22
(discussing qualified Indian entities). Treating boat sales specially was necessary, argued the government, because net
sales proceeds were understood not to be "from fishing
(Footnote 79 continued in next column.)
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Perhaps there are weak spots in this analysis;
lawyers can pick holes in almost any argument. But
with the canons of construction as reinforcements, I'm
confident that any manufactured doubts should have
been resolved favorably to Warbus. The Supreme Court
in Squire v. Capoeman interpreted similar "derived
directly" language liberally (although, in that case, a
phrase interpreting statutory language rather than a
phrase taken from the controlling statute) to hold some
of a tribal member's income exempt from federal income taxation. 80

I

The opinion in Warbus is an inherently
incomplete analysis. That fact by itself
should give us pause in relying on the
Warbus opinion in future cases.

In Judge Dean's defense, there are facts in Warbus
that could reasonably have given the court pause on
the statutory interpretation issue. The borrowing occurred in 1984, a couple of years before Warbus participated in the fishing activity of the tribe. Perhaps
that's a significant fact although, if so, one wishes that
the judge would have explained its significance. 81 In

rights-related activities." Without the special rule, a boat sale
could therefore have disqualified an otherwise qualified entity. If boat ~ales proceeds are not section 7873 income, the
government continued, neither is income attributable to a
boat's foreclosure. Respondent's Brief in Answer at 12-13,
Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96).
The government's argument has some force, but it gives
much too much weight to what is, after all, a footnote in a
report on a tangential issue. The purpose of the 90 percent
test is to determine whether an entity is a qualified Indian
entity; it has nothing to do with whether an individual's
income is attributable to treaty activity. In addition, the
footnote's purpose is to suggest that, consistent with the
canons, the apparently aU-or-nothing test to be a qualified
Indian entity should not be applied in a draconian way. It
would turn the canons on their head to use this passage to
restrict exemption under section 7873. Finally, for what it's
worth, gain from the sale of an asset and DOl income are not
the same thing. Cf section 108(a) (permitting deferral of DOl
income but not gain in some circumstances).
80
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
81
Maybe he did so indirectly. Judge Dean noted that
even had petitioner's loan proceeds been income in the
first instance in 1984 [i.e., the year of borrowing], their
source was not activity directly related to harvesting,
processing, transporting, or selling fish in the exercise
of recognized fishing rights of an Indian tribe. Forgiveness of the repayment of those loan proceeds by a third
party cannot convert the freeing of petitioner's assets
into fishing-rights-related income merely because the
loan proceeds were used to purchase equipment used
in such an activity.
Warbus, 110 T.C. at 284. Putting aside the judge's continued
conflation of the "derived directly from" and the "activity"
tests, I suppose that passage can be interpreted as attaching
significance to the fact that the borrowing preceded Warbus' s
participation in the tribal fishing activity: that is, the borrow(Footnote 81 continued on next page.)
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addition? the DOI income was not recognized until
1993f a couple of years after Warbus had ceased participating in the activity. Perhaps that too is a relevant
fact (although, again, one would like to know why). 82

The failure to apply the canons may not have been
Judge Dean's fault, but it was a failing. As result, the
opinion in Warbus is an inherently incomplete analysis.
That fact by itself should give us pause in relying on
the War bus opinion in future ~cases.

a

III. A Final Canon Shot
As I read section 7873, Warbus had good arguments
in support of his position even without the canons of
construction. If we apply the canons, as we're obligated
to do, the result is an easy one: DOI income arising
from the foreclosure of a boat used in a treaty-protected
fishing activity is exempt.
A skeptical reader might suggest that the canons
should not have been applied in Warbus because the
section 7873 issue was not a typical "Indian rights"
question. It was a tribal member rather than the Lummi
Nation who would have benefitted directly by a different result in the case.
I'm not persuaded.
Section 7873 deals with traditional, treaty-protected
tribal rights; applying the statute in a narrow way to
a tribal member inevitably affects the economic wellbeing of the tribe. And it's not as though the canons
have been applied only in cases in which tribal rights
have been directly implicated. As we've seenf the
Supreme Court, in its most important case discussing
the federal income tax liability of individual Indiansf
Squire v. Capoeman, 83 applied the canons as a matter of
routine. 84
In any eventf as far as I can tell, Warbus wasn't the
result of a principled determination that the canons were
irrelevant. No such determination could have been made;
the judge wasn't aware of the canons' existence.
ing, had it otherwise been taxable, would not have been
protected by section 7873 (which didn't exist in 1984); a later
discharge of the indebtedness therefore shouldn't escape
taxation. Even if that's what Judge Dean meant, he wasn't
necessarily right. The DOl income must be analyzed under
section 7873. The income was not realized until1993; since it
wasn't "secured as of March 17, 1988," it was not governed
by pre-1988 act law. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, section 3044(b), 102 Stat.
3342, 3642 (codified at 26 U.S.C. section 7873 (quoting language of 1988 act, section 3044(b)).
82
Surely DOl income attributable to a taxpayer's passive
activity would continue to be income from a passive activity
even if it were recognized after the underlying trade or business ceased. Cf. section 469(f)(1) (permitting carried-over
deductions from a former passive activity- e.g., because the
taxpayer's level of participation has increased - to offset
income from the no-longer-passive activity).
83
See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
84
Although the tribal members lost in each case, the
canons were nominally applied in the pre-section 7873 cases
considering the federal income taxation of income derived
from treaty-protected fishing. See supra note 35.
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IV. Conclusion
The world isn't necessarily made up of purely
American Indian law cases or purely tax cases. Sometimes apparently discrete bodies of law intersect, and
courts, practitioners, and scholars must deal with that
overlap. Warbus should have been such a case.
Unfortunately, counsel for Warbus merely noted the
"intersection of Indian Law with Tax Law" 85 and then
did little or nothing to help Judge Dean deal with that
intersection. It wouldn't have taken much. A
boilerplate recitation of the canons of construction
would have helped alert the judge to the American
Indian law implications of the case.
I'm not sure why Warbus turned into such a disaster.
Part of the problem, I suspect, is that it was not a big
dollar case. The tax due on $13,506 of income, after
taking into account the effects of standard deductions,
personal exemptions, and low marginal rates, is very
small. A case of this sort will therefore not elicit the
legal effort that the larger issues might justify, and
some of the technical issues w:ould have taken substantial time to develop.
On the other hand, very little effort was necessary
to get the American Indian law issues on the table. If
nothing elsef Warbus illustrates the dangers in having
individual Indians litigating issues that affect larger,
tribal interests. Section 7873 has important effects on
tribal members who engage in protected fishing, but
the ultimate beneficiaries are the tribes. Exempting
members' income from federal income taxation
promotes the economic position of tribes. Warbus's inadequate arguments led to an incredibly limited understanding of the income eligible for exemption, and it's
tribal interests that will suffer if Warbus is taken
seriously as precedent.
Obviously the Warbus opinion cannot be airbrushed
out of the legal picture; 86 it's there in print (and on line)
for us to ponder and criticize. But we should get as
close as we possibly can to the effect of airbrushing:
the next time a court hears a section 7873 issue it should
act as if Warbus had never been decided.

85
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110
T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96).
86
Cf. David King, The Commissar Vanishes: The Falsification
of Photographs and Art in Stalin's Russia (1997).
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